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Abstract—An argumentation based negotiation model is sup-
ported by information theory. Argumentative dialogues change
the models of agents with respect to ongoing relationships.
Trust and Honour are key components. Trust measures expected
deviations of behaviour in the execution of commitments. Honour
measures the expected integrity of the arguments exchanged. We
understand rhetorical moves in dialogues as actions to project
the current relationships into the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is in the area labelled: information-based agency
[13]. An information-based agent has an identity, values,
needs, plans and strategies all of which are expressed using a
fixed ontology in probabilistic logic for internal representation
and in an illocutionary language. Negotiation dialogues have
been traditionally organised a-round the basic illocutionary
particles Offer, Accept and Reject. Previous work has been
centred on the design of negotiation strategies and on propos-
ing agent architectures able to deal with the exchange of offers
[6], [3]. Game theory [11], possibilistic logic and first-order
logic [7] have been used for this purpose. Some initial steps in
proposing rhetoric particles have been made, especially around
the idea of appeals, rewards and threats [14]. However, no
formal model of the meaning of these speech acts has been
proposed yet. Expanded negotiation dialogues, including these
rhetoric moves, are known as argumentation-based negotia-
tions. Argumentation in this sense is mainly to do with building
(business) relationships. When we reward or threaten we refer
to a future instant of time where the reward or threat will
be effective, its scope goes beyond the current negotiation
round. We will understand argumentation in this paper as an
information exchange process between agents. Every illocu-
tion that an agent utters gives away valuable information. To
evaluate each illocution exchanged we base our information-
based agent architecture on information theory.
We distinguish between the trust that an agent displays
through the enactment of its contracts, and the honour that
an agent displays in sustaining its trading relationships. The
enactment of a contract is uncertain to some extent, and trust,
precisely, is a measure of how uncertain the enactment of a
contract is. Trust is therefore a measure of expected deviations
of behaviour along a dimension determined by the type of the
contract [12]. In this sense, the higher the trust the lower the
expectation that a (significant) deviation from what is signed
occurs. Exchanged information may turn out to be partly false,
and promises may be partly broken. We introduce the concept
of Honour to measure the expected integrity of the information
and promises exchanged. This leads to a natural hierarchy:
individual deals, (business) relationships and businesses.
We first introduce an argumentation language in Section II.
Then we define an information based model in Section III
that supports our model of Honour in Section IV. How the
information is managed is explained in Section V.
II. INTERACTION LANGUAGE
In order for communication to be effective agents need to agree
upon an ontology and a communication language.
To model the agent dialogues we define ontology to include
a (minimum) repertoire of elements: a set of concepts organ-
ised in an is-a hierarchy, captured by a partial order relation,
a set of relations defined over these concepts, and a set of
axioms defined over the concepts and relations. We model
ontologies following an algebraic approach and present ontolo-
gies as logical theories in the form of pairs O = (S,A) where
S is the ontological signature, representing the vocabulary, and
A is a set of ontological axioms, specifying the interpreation
of the vocabulary in a given context. The signature is usually
represented as a mathematical structure and the set of axioms
are usually written in a logical formalism. In our case, we
define an ontology signature as a tuple S = (C,R,≤, σ)
where C is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic data
types); R is a finite set of relation symbols; ≤ is a reflexive,
transitive and anti-symmetric relation on C (a partial order);
and, σ : R → C+ is the function assigning to each relation
symbol its arity. Concepts play somehow the role of type, and
the is-a hierarchy is the notion of subtype. Thus, type inference
mechanisms can be used to type all symbols appearing in
expressions. Once the basic ontology signature is fixed we
need to define a language to express, in our case, contracts,
promises, rewards and so on. We denote that language as LS .
The axioms in the ontology will be written in that language,
A ⊆ LS , a first order language defined over the ontological
expressions.
In our dialogues an essential concept is that of contract.
Contracts are usually thought of as having a number of issues
(dimensions) associated with values (or regions). We define
the ontological context of formula ϕ ∈ LS , denoted O(ϕ), as
the set of concepts in C used by the literals of ϕ. We extend
the subtype relationship, ≤, in the following way,
ϕ ≤ ψ ⇐⇒ ∀ci ∈ O(ϕ) (∃cj ∈ O(ψ).ci ≤ cj)
We base the definition of the semantic distance between two
concepts on the path length over the ≤ of the signature (more
distance in the graph is more semantic distance), and the depth
of the subsumer concept on the shortest path between the two
concepts (the deeper in the hierarchy, the closer the meaning
of the concepts) [8]:
Sim(c1, c2) = e−κ1l · e
κ2h − e−κ2h
eκ2h + e−κ2h
where l is the shortest path between the concepts, h is the
depth of the deepest concept subsuming both concepts, and
κ1 and κ2 are parameters scaling the contribution of shortest
path length and depth respectively.
From the semantic distance between two concepts we de-
fine the semantic distance between formulae as the maxmin






III. AN INFORMATION-BASED MODEL
We ground our argumentation model on information-based
concepts. Entropy, H , is a measure of uncertainty [9] in
a probability distribution for a discrete random variable X:
H(X) , −∑i p(xi) log p(xi) where p(xi) = P (X = xi).
Maximum entropy inference and minimum relative entropy
inference are chosen partly because of their encapsulation of
common sense reasoning [10].
Maximum entropy inference is used to derive sentence
probabilities for that which is not known by constructing the
“maximally noncommittal” [5] probability distribution, and
minimum relative entropy inference is used to update these
distributions. These forms of inference are criticised [4] for
their dependence on the representation chosen — such as the
way in which values for a continuous variable are represented
as intervals. We argue to the contrary, that this choice enables
the tailoring of the model in fine detail.
Given a prior probability distribution q = (qi)ni=1 and a
set of constraints, the principle of minimum relative entropy
chooses the posterior probability distribution p = (pi)ni=1 that
has the least relative entropy with respect to q, and that satisfies
the constraints.
[1] describes the estimation of both P (Acc(α, β, δ)) and the
estimation of P (Acc(β, α, δ)) which is α’s estimate of β’s
willingness to accept δ. These estimates are derived by ap-
plying maximum entropy inference to the observed behaviour
of the agents. In the subsequent subsection we’ll see how α
updates its sentence probabilities for Honour(·) by observation
following receipt of the illocutionary particles described in
Section II.
A. Updating honour from observations
The choice of trading partner is influenced by the observation
of the fulfilment of informs, rewards and threats. Such illo-
cutions are a conditional commitment to act. Agent α has the
opportunity to observe the extent to which agent β sticks to his
word in Reward(·), Threat(·) and Inform(·) illocutions, and
to observe how accurate his info is. We base our measure of
honour as the negative entropy of the probability distribution of
possible outcomes following such a given illocution — honour
measures the relationship between commitment and execution
of promises. More precisely, between issued illocutions and
their perceived execution. In this way, a natural way to base
our modelling of honour is on a conditional probability, P t,
between commitment and observation given a context e as:
P t(Observe(α,ϕ′) |
(Reward(β, α, δ, ϕ); Accept(α, β, δ)), e)
where every reward execution represents a point in that distri-
bution. For threats and informs the distributions are:
P t(Observe(α,ϕ′) |
(Threat(β, α, δ, ϕ);¬Accept(α, β, δ)), e)
P t(Observe(α,ϕ′) | (Inform(β, α, ϕ)), e)
For simplicity, we denote these relationships between the
commitment, ϕ, and the observation, ϕ′, as P t(ϕ′|ϕ, e).
An important aspect that we want to model is the fact
that beliefs ‘evaporate’ as time goes by. If we don’t keep an
ongoing relationship, we become unsure how honourable a
trading partner is. If I stop buying meat from my butcher,
I’m not sure anymore that he will commit to his promises.
This decay is what justifies a continuous relationship between
individuals. In our model, the conditional probabilities should
tend to ignorance as represented by the decay limit distribution
{di}. If we have the set of observations Φ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn}
then complete ignorance of the opponent’s expected behaviour
means that given the opponent commits to ϕ the conditional
probability for each observable outcome ϕ′ becomes di = 1n
— i.e. the unconstrained maximum entropy distribution — but
α may be prepared to make assumptions about β’s decay limit
distribution so that its entropy is less than this. This natural
decay of belief is offset by new observations.
We define the evolution of the probability distribution that
supports the previous definition of decay using an equation
inspired by pheromone like models [2]:
P t+1(φ′|φ) =
κ · ((1− ν) · di + ν · (P t(φ′|φ) + ∆tP (φ′|φ))) (1)
where κ is a normalisation constant and {di} is the decay limit
distribution for β. This equation models the passage of time for
a conveniently large ν ∈ [0, 1] and where the term ∆tP (φ′|φ)
represents the increment in an instant of time according to the
last experienced event as the following shows.
Similarity based. The question is how to use the observation
ϕ′ given a commitment ϕ (generated by a sequence of
illocutions Reward(α, β, δ, ϕ); Accept(β, α, δ) — similarly
for others) in the context of a deal δ ≤ ρ in the update of
the overall probability distribution over the set of all possible
outcomes defined over LC . Here we use the idea that given a
particular deviation in a region of the space, similar deviations
should be expected in other regions. The intuition behind the
update is that if my butcher has not honoured commitments
with respect to red meat, then I might expect similar deviations
with respect to poultry.
This idea is built upon the previously defined Sim function
(see Section II) to take into account the difference between
acceptance probabilities and similarity between the perception
of the execution x of a reward (or threat) y. Thus, after the
observation of ϕ′ the increment of probability distribution at
time t+ 1 is:
∆tP (φ′|φ) = (1− | Sim(ϕ′, ϕ)− Sim(φ′, φ) |) (2)
Entropy based. Suppose that α has a business relationship ρ
with agent β, that β promises φ, and this promise is sound.
The material value of φ to ρ will depend on the future use
that α makes of it, and that is unlikely to be known. So α
estimates the value of φ to the honour he holds for β in ρ
using a probability distribution (p1, . . . , pn) over a relationship
evaluation space E = (e1, . . . , en) that could range from “that
is what I expect from the perfect trading partner” to “it is
totally useless” — E may contain hard or fuzzy values. pi =
wi(ρ, φ) is the probability that ei is the correct evaluation
of the enactment φ in the context of relationship ρ, and w :
LS × LS → [0, 1]n is the promise evaluation function.
Let LS = (φ1, . . . , φm) in some order. Then for a given
φk, (P tβ(φ1|φk), . . . , P tβ(φm|φk)) is the prior distribution of
α’s estimate of what will actually occur if β promised that φk
would occur and w(ρ, φk) = (w1(ρ, φk), . . . , wn(ρ, φk)) is
α’s evaluation over E with respect to the relationship ρ of β’s
promise φk. α’s expected evaluation of what will occur given
that β has promised that φk will occur is: wexp(ρ, φk) = m∑
j=1
P tβ(φj |φk) · w1(ρ, φj), . . . ,
m∑
j=1
P tβ(φj |φk) · wn(ρ, φj)
 .
Now suppose that α observes the event (ϕ′|ϕ) in another
relationship ρ′ also with agent β. Eg: α may buy wine and
cheese from the same supplier. α may wish to revise the prior
estimate wexp(ρ, φk) in the light of the observation (ϕ′|ϕ) to:
(wrev(ρ, φk) | (ϕ′|ϕ)) =
g(wexp(ρ, φk), w(ρ′, ϕ), w(ρ′, ϕ′), ρ, ρ′, φ, ϕ, ϕ′),
for some function g — the idea being, for example, that if
the promise, ϕ, concerning the purchase of cheese, ρ′, was
not kept then α’s expectation that the promise, φ, concerning
the purchase of wine, ρ, will not be kept should increase. The
entropy based approach estimates ∆tβP (φ
′|φ) by applying the












satisfying the n constraints C, and p = (pj)mj=1. Then:
∆tP (φ′|φ) = P tβ,C(φ′|φ)− P tβ(φ′|φ) (4)
Where the n constraints C are:
∑m
j=1 pj · wi(ρ, φj) =
gi(wexp(ρ, φk), w(ρ′, ϕ), w(ρ′, ϕ′), ρ, ρ′, φ, ϕ, ϕ′)
for i = 1, . . . , n. This is a set of n linear equations in m
unknowns, and so the calculation of the minimum relative
entropy distribution may be impossible if n > m. In this case,
we take only the m equations for which the change from the
prior to the posterior value is greatest. That is, we attempt to
select the most significant factors.
IV. AN HONOUR MODEL
Honour as expected behaviour. Consider a distribution of
expected fulfilment of promises that represent α’s “ideal” for
a relationship with β, in the sense that it is the best that
α could reasonably expect β to do. This distribution will
be a function of β, α’s history with β, anything else that
α believes about β, and general environmental information
including time — denote all of this by e, then we have
P tI (ϕ
′|ϕ, e). For example, if α considers that it is unacceptable
for the execution ϕ′ to be less preferred than the promise ϕ
then P tI (ϕ
′|ϕ, e) will only be non-zero for those ϕ′ that α
prefers to ϕ. The distribution P tI (·) represents what α expects,
or hopes, β will do. Honour is the relative entropy between
this ideal distribution, P tI (ϕ
′|ϕ, e), and the distribution of the
observation of fulfilled promises, P tβ(ϕ
′|ϕ). That is:










where the “1” is an arbitrarily chosen constant being the
maximum value that honour may have. This equation defines
honour for one, single promise ϕ — for example, my honour
in my butcher if he promises me a 10% discount for the rest of
the year. It makes sense to aggregate these values over a class
of promises, say over those ϕ that are subtypes of a particular
relationship ρ, that is ϕ ≤ ρ. In this way we measure the
honour that I have in my butcher in relation to the promises
he makes for red meat generally:


















where P tβ(ϕ) is a probability distribution over the space of
promises that the next promise β will make to α is ϕ.















Honour as expected ‘preferability’. The previous notion
of honour requires that an ideal distribution, P tI (ϕ
′|ϕ, e),
has to be specified for each ϕ. The idea behind honour as
expected ‘preferability’ is that in a trading relationship, ρ, if
the execution ϕ′ of a promise is preferable to that that was
promised ϕ then α will honour β more. The extent to which an
enactment, ϕ′, can be ‘preferable’ to a promise, ϕ, is limited.
For example, if my grocer promises me a 10% discount on
tomatoes and gives me 15% then I may be delighted, but if
he gives me a 95% discount then my desire to trade with
him may diminish. Given a predicate Prefer(c1, c2, e) meaning
that α prefers c1 to c2 in environment e. An evaluation of
P t(Prefer(c1, c2, e)) may be defined using Sim(·) and the
evaluation function w — but we do not detail it here. Then if
ϕ ≤ ρ:
H(α, β, ϕ) =
∑
ϕ′
















Honour as certainty in promise execution. Honour is
consistency in expected acceptable executions of promises, or
“the lack of expected uncertainty in those possible executions
that are better than the promise as specified”. Then if ϕ ≤ ρ
let: Φ+(ϕ, ρ, κ) = {ϕ′ | P t(Prefer(ϕ′, ϕ, ρ)) > κ} for some
constant κ. The idea here is that α will honour β more
if variations, ϕ′, from expectation, ϕ, are not random. The
Honour that an agent α has on agent β with respect to the
execution of a promise ϕ is:













1 if |Φ+(ϕ, ρ, κ)| = 1
log |Φ+(ϕ, ρ, κ)| otherwise
As above we aggregate this measure for those promises of
a particular type ρ:


















′, ϕ) logP t+(ϕ
′|ϕ)]
B∗ ·∑ϕ:ϕ≤ρ P tβ(ϕ)
where P tβ(ϕ
′, ϕ) is the joint probability distribution, and
P t+(ϕ






















′, ϕ) logP t+(ϕ
′|ϕ)]
B∗
Evaluating honour. The various expressions for honour given
above involve extensive calculations. For example, Eqn. 5
contains
∑
ϕ′ that sums over all possible enactments ϕ
′. To
develop the above into a more computationally friendly model
we appeal to the structure of the ontology described in Sec. ??.
For example, Eqn. 5 may be approximated to:










′|ϕ, e) is the normalisation of P tI (ϕ′|ϕ, e) for
Sim(ϕ′, ϕ) ≥ η, and similarly for P tη,β(ϕ′|ϕ). The extent
of this calculation is controlled by the parameter η. An
even tighter restriction may be obtained with: Sim(ϕ′, ϕ) ≥
η and ϕ′ ≤ ψ. For example, if β promises a 10% discount on
tomatoes next month, we may choose to evaluate H(α, β, ϕ)
for promises ϕ′ that are both close to this promise, ϕ, and
that concern tomatoes, ψ.
V. DEALING WITH [ info ].
In this section we discuss how to deal with the information that
β communicates in the illocutions, info ∈ LC . We will base
this treatment on β’s reliability as an estimate of the extent to
which this info is correct. For example, β may send α the info
that “the price of fish will go up by 10% next week”, and it
may actually go up by 9%. α’s argumentation and relationship
building strategies are based on plans that are not described
here. Those plans determine a set of probability distributions
from which a world model is derived. info is represented as a
set of linear constraints on one or more of those probability
distributions. A chunk of info may not be directly related to
one of those distributions, or may not be expressed naturally
as constraints, and so some inference machinery is required
to derive these constraints — this inference is performed by
a set of model building function, Js, for each active plan s
chosen by α. If a plan s calls for the distribution D then JDs
is the model building function for D, and JDs (info) is the set
of constraints on D derived from info.
A. Updating the world model with info
If at time u, α receives a message containing info it is time-
stamped and source-stamped info(β,α,u), and placed in a repos-
itory Yt. If α has an active plan, s, then the model building
function, Js, is applied to info(β,α,u) to derive constraints on
some, or none, of α’s distributions. The extent to which those
constraints are permitted to effect the distributions is deter-
mined by a value for the reliability of β, Rt(α, β,O(info)).
An agent may have models of integrity decay for some par-
ticular distributions, but general models of integrity decay for,
say, a chunk of information taken at random from the World
Wide Web are generally unknown. However the values to
which decaying integrity should tend in time are often known.
For example, a prior value for the truth of the proposition that
a “22 year-old male will default on credit card repayment” is
well known to banks. As described in Sec. III-A, if α attaches
such prior values to a distribution D they are called the decay
limit distribution for D, (dDi )
n
i=1. No matter how integrity of
info decays, in the absence of any other relevant information
it should decay to the decay limit distribution.
In the absence of new info the integrity of distributions
decays. If D = (qi)ni=1 then we use a geometric model of
decay:
qt+1i = (1− νD)× dDi + νD × qti , for i = 1, . . . , n (6)
where νD ∈ (0, 1) is the decay rate. This raises the question of
how to determine νD. Just as an agent may know the decay
limit distribution it may also know something about νD. In
the case of an information-overfed agent there is no harm
in conservatively setting νD “a bit on the low side” as the
continually arriving info will sustain the estimate for D.
We now describe how new info is imported to the distribu-
tions. A single chunk of info may affect a number of distribu-
tions. Suppose that a chunk of info is received from β and that
α attaches the epistemic belief probability Rt(α, β,O(info))
to it. Each distribution models a facet of the world. Given a
distribution D = (qi)ni=1, qi is the probability that the possible
world ωi for D is the true world for D. The effect that a
chunk info has on distribution D is to enforce the set of linear
constraints on D, JDs (info). If the constraints J
D
s (info) are
taken by α as valid then α could update D to the posterior
distribution (pinfoi )
n
i=1 that is the distribution with least relative
entropy with respect to (qti)
n
i=1 satisfying the constraint:∑
i
{pinfoi : JDs (info) are all > in ωi} = 1. (7)
But Rt(α, β,O(info)) = r ∈ [0, 1] and α should only treat the
JDs (info) as valid if r = 1. In general r determines the extent
to which the effect of info on D makes it closer to (pinfoi )
n
i=1
or to the prior (qti)
n
i=1 distribution by:
pti = r × pinfoi + (1− r)× qti (8)
But, we should only permit a new chunk of info to influence
D if doing so gives us new information. For example, if 5
minutes ago a trusted agent advises α that the interest rate
will go up by 1%, and 1 minute ago a very unreliable agent
advises α that the interest rate may go up by 0.5%, then the
second unreliable chunk should not be permitted to ‘overwrite’
the first. We capture this by only permitting a new chunk
of info to be imported if the resulting distribution has more
information relative to the decay limit distribution than the
existing distribution has. Precisely, this is measured using the













In addition, we have described in Eqn. 6 how the integrity of
each distribution D will decay in time. Combining these two
into one result, distribution D is revised to:
qt+1i =

(1− νD)× dDi + νD × pti if usable info is
received at time t
(1− νD)× dDi + νD × qti otherwise
for i = 1, · · · , n, and decay rate νD as before. We have yet to
estimate Rt(α, β,O(info)) — that is described in Sec. V-B.
We now illustrate the above by showing how an important
class of info illocutions, namely preference information, is
managed.
Preferences. Preference information is a statement by an agent
that it prefers one class of deals to another where deals may
be multi-issue. Preference illocutions may refer to particular
issues within deals — e.g. “I prefer red to yellow”, or to
combinations of issues — e.g. “I prefer a car with a five
year warranty to the same car with a two year warranty than
costs 15% less”. Here α receives preference information, info,
from β through an Inform(β, α, info) illocution, or through
one of the other argumentation illocutions — see Sec. II
— and attaches Rt(α, β,O(info)) to it. What happens next
will depend on α’s plans. Suppose that α has a plan s that
constructs the probability distribution P t(UPrefer(β, α, δ))
over all δ meaning that “δ is the deal that β prefers most”. α
may know the decay limit distribution for UPrefer(·). Suppose
α has a prior distribution (qti)
n
i=1 for UPrefer(·). Now suppose
that α learns the info “x% of the time β prefers deals with
property Q1 to those with property Q2”. JUPrefers derives
















and the procedure described above follows as described.
Note that this manages two different probabilities: first, the
probability within the info “x% of the time. . . ”, and second
α’s estimate of β’s reliability in providing information of this
sort, Rt(α, β,O(info)), that is determined by the ontological
context O(info) of the info.
B. A reliability model
We estimate Rt(α, β,O(info)) by measuring the error in infor-
mation. α’s plans will have constructed a set of distributions.
We measure the ‘error’ in information as the error in the effect
that information has on each of α’s distributions. Suppose
that a chunk of info is received from agent β at time u
and is verified at some later time t. For example, a chunk
of information could be “the interest rate will rise by 0.5%
next week”, and suppose that the interest rate actually rises
by 0.25% — call that correct information fact. What does all
this tell agent α about agent β’s reliability? Consider one of
α’s distributions D that is {qui } at time u. Let (pinfoi )ni=1 be
the minimum relative entropy distribution given that info has
been received as calculated in Eqn. 7, and let (pfacti )
n
i=1 be that
distribution if fact had been received instead. Suppose that the
reliability estimate for distribution D was RuD. This section
is concerned with what RuD should have been in the light of
knowing now, at time t, that info should have been fact, and
how that knowledge effects our current reliability estimate for
D, Rt(α, β,O(info)).
The idea of Eqn. 8, is that the current value of r should
be such that, on average, (pui )
n
i=1 will be seen to be “close
to” (pfacti )
n
i=1 when we eventually discover fact — no matter
whether or not info was used to update D, as determined by
the acceptability test in Eqn. 9 at time u. That is, given info,











using Eqn. 7. Then the observed reliability for distribution D,
R
(info|fact)
D , on the basis of the verification of info with fact is












(r · pinfoi + (1− r) · qui ) log
r · pinfoi + (1− r) · qui
pfacti
If Einfo is the set of distributions that info affects, then the
overall observed reliability on the basis of the verification of
info with fact is: R(info|fact) = 1−(maxD∈Einfo |1−R(info|fact)D |).
Then for each ontological context oj , at time t when, perhaps,
a chunk of info, with O(info) = ok, may have been verified
with fact:
Rt+1(α, β, oj) =
(1− ν)×Rt(α, β, oj) + ν ×R(info|fact) × Sim(oj , ok)
where Sim measures the semantic distance between two sec-
tions of the ontology, and ν is the learning rate. Over time, α
notes the ontological context of the various chunks of info
received from β and over the various ontological contexts
calculates the relative frequency, P t(oj), of these contexts,
oj = O(info). This leads to a overall expectation of the




P t(oj)×Rt(α, β, oj)
VI. CONCLUSION
The agent architecture is summarised in Fig. 1. α’s actions are
determined by its relationship-building strategy that identifies
trading partners, and by its negotiation strategy that man-
ages individual negotiations. We described two new concepts:
Honour(·) and Reliability(·). Honour(·) models the fulfil-
ment of the promises derived from the use of argumentative
particles such as appeals, rewards and threats. This concept
plays a similar role to that that the concept of Trust(·)
plays with respect to the fulfilment of contract agreements,
as developed in [12]. Reliability(·) models the reliability of
the information tabled by an opponent. We have proposed a
semantics for these two concepts based on information theory.
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